The impact of management, family, and institution on the auditor's going concern opinion issuance decision by Osman, Mohammad Noor Hisham et al.
671 
 
 
 
Int. Journal of Economics and Management 12 (2): 671-691 (2018) 
 
IJEM 
International Journal of Economics and  Management 
 
Journal homepage: http://www.ijem.upm.edu.my 
 
 
The Impact of Management, Family, and Institution on The Auditor’s 
Going Concern Opinion Issuance Decision 
 
MOHAMMAD NOOR HISHAM OSMANa*, AHMED RAZMAN ABDUL LATIFFb, 
ZAIDI MAT DAUDa AND ZULKARNAIN MUHAMAD SORIc 
 
 
 
aFaculty of Economics and Management, Universiti Putra Malaysia, Malaysia 
bPutra Business School, Malaysia. 
cInternational Centre for Education in Islamic Finance (INCEIF) 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
Incidents where external auditors do not issue a going concern audit opinion (GC opinion) 
to companies having severe financial problems have been reported globally. This issue 
motivated this study – (i) to investigate the effect of selected auditor characteristics in terms 
of specialization, tenure, and fee on GC opinion issuance and (ii) to examine the moderating 
effect of management’s, family’s, and institution’s influence on the relationship between 
auditor characteristics and GC opinion issuance. The study involves 644 Malaysian 
financially distressed listed companies in the period 2006 to 2012. The results of a panel 
logistic regression analysis show that auditor characteristics have no relationship with GC 
opinion issuance. Influential management - measured as the level of their ownership - can 
dampen the positive relationship between auditor specialization and auditor tenure with GC 
opinion issuance. The presence of an influential family, on the other hand, can strengthen 
the positive relationship between auditor tenure and GC opinion. No evidence about an 
influential institution’s impact on the GC opinion process could be found. In conclusion, 
while auditor characteristics do not affect the possibility of a GC opinion issuance, pressure 
imposed by influential management and family on the auditor during the audit opinion 
decision process does have an impact. 
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INTRODUCTION  
 
The applicable International Standard on Auditing 570 (ISA 570)  states that auditors must (i) assess and 
conclude about the appropriateness of a client’s management application of the going concern principle in the 
financial statement preparation and (ii) provide a conclusion about the client’s going concern status 
(International Federation of Accountants, 2015). Auditors are supposed to provide a credible external and 
independent professional certification (Garcia-Blandon and Argiles, 2015). The instance when an auditor issues 
a GC opinion appropriately can be seen as an indicator of high audit quality (Hossain, 2013; Knechel and 
Vanstraelen, 2007), but such a good case is always an ideal. The problem of a low GC opinion issuance rate to 
financially distressed companies has been reported in the US (Read and Yezegel, 2018; Read, 2015), the UK 
(Citron and Taffler, 2004), Australia (Young and Wang, 2010), and Spain (Garcia-Blandon and Argiles, 2015).  
In the context of Malaysia, the practice of not issuing a GC opinion in appropriate situations is a pressing 
local issue. A survey conducted by Osman et al., (2016) reported that auditors issued GC opinion to only 
between 11 and 30% of financially distressed Malaysian property and construction industry listed companies. 
Earlier, Abdul Wahab et al., (2013) analysed data from 379 selected financially distressed companies and found 
that only 6.3% of them had received a GC opinion. As early as 2009 (and until recently), the Financial Statement 
Review Committee (FSRC) of Malaysian Institute of Accountants revealed that the most common weakness in 
financial statements under their selective review was in the assessment of the appropriateness of GC assumption 
(see Accountants Today, December 2009, May or June 2012, November 2010, November, 2009).  
The incident of major corporate collapses at the beginning of this millennium, particularly Enron and 
WorldCom, and the cost stakeholders had to pay for it, has demonstrated the importance of the issuance of a 
GC opinion. The case of Enron, for instance, reveals that Arthur Andersen (the company’s audit firm since it 
was set up) did not issue a GC opinion even though they were aware of the major viability problem faced by 
the company, and this omission by the auditor caused great financial loss to shareholders and creditors. In 
Malaysia, the importance of a GC opinion transpired in the investigation of the controversial high profile case 
of 1 Malaysia Development Berhad (1MDB). Malaysia’s Public Account Committee (PAC) specifically 
questioned Deloitte, the external auditor of the company, about why the debt-laden 1MDB had been issued a 
clean audit opinion instead of a GC opinion (see Asia One Business News, 2015; The Star Online, 2015).  
Ironically, it is not an unexpected development for Malaysian auditors as well as auditors in other 
countries to not issue a GC opinion to their most distressed clients. Auditors seem to hold on to the idea that no 
auditing standards require them to predict corporate failure, although this is the opposite of financial statement 
user expectations (Ryu, Uliss, & Roh, 2009). In addition, issuing a GC opinion is a less favourable resort for 
auditors because it could lead to losing a client. A client that has been given a GC report tends to switch auditors; 
this could be to punish the auditor and to find a new more ‘flexible’ auditor or simply because management-
auditor conflict following a GC opinion issuance is too severe (Carcello and Neal, 2003; Craswell, 1988). For 
the non-litigious context1 like Malaysia, the likely pressure for the auditor to issue a GC opinion, if any, is to 
maintain a good reputation.  
Not unlike the auditors, client companies are reluctant to accept a GC audit opinion given that such a 
situation would have a negative effect on their listing status. The current Bursa Malaysia’s Practice Note 17 
(PN17) states that the criteria for public listed companies (PLC) that would fall into a distress status include one 
that receives a modified opinion with emphasis on the inappropriateness of the GC assumption (Bursa Malaysia 
Securities Berhad, 2009, para. 2.1e). When a company falls into PN17 status, it sends a negative signal to 
shareholders and creditors, consequently jeopardizing the possibility of acquiring future cheap capital, and even 
resulting in forced liquidation (the case of Kenmark Industrial Co. (M) Bhd., for instance). Insights from the 
US show that companies that have been issued a GC opinion would face a negative market reaction  (Blay and 
Geiger, 2001; Citron et al., 2008; Kausar et al., 2015; Loudder et al., 1992), a higher cost of equity capital (Amin 
et al., 2014), and an inability to continue operating (Callaghan et al., 2009).  
Even though the issuance of a GC opinion is not favored by Malaysian auditors and is unfavorable to 
their clients, the appropriate issuance of such an opinion primarily stands on the firm ground of the preservation  
 
                                                          
1 A condition where the pressure for auditors to issue a GC opinion is less compared to in a litigious environment  (Geiger & Raghunandan, 
2002b) 
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of stakeholders’ interest. Arguably, stakeholders, including customers, suppliers, and creditors, are the main 
beneficiaries of the issuance of such an audit opinion. A GC opinion could function as an early signal to the 
stakeholders regarding the ability of a company to stay afloat and could save billions of dollars of stakeholders’ 
capital if issued appropriately. At least one study has found that investors in the US and the UK react negatively 
in the capital market after GC opinion issuance, showing that the opinion in fact has market relevance (Kausar 
et al., 2015).  
The topic of GC opinion issuance to financially distressed companies has been examined in both 
developed and developing markets. Most studies have examined the effect of auditor characteristics on the 
issuance of such an audit opinion (Boone et al., 2010; Chiang et al., 2015; Firth et al., 2012; Garcia-Blandon 
and Argiles, 2015; Lim and Tan, 2008; Read, 2015; Shafie et al., 2009). In addition, the literature also shows 
that the ability of the auditor to perform audit activities independently is affected by certain forms of internal 
pressures, particularly from the management, family, and institutions who own a company, hence affecting the 
propensity to issue a GC opinion (Abdul Wahab et al., 2011; Ballesta and Garcia-Meca, 2005; Callaghan et al., 
2009). However, no empirical tests on this relationship have been done. This motivated this study to seek 
answers to the following questions: Is there any significant association between Malaysian auditor 
characteristics viz. specialization, tenure, and fee, and the issuance of a GC opinion? Do the levels of 
management, family, and institutional influence moderate the association between auditor characteristics and 
the issuance of a GC opinion? 
This study makes a contribution to the current literature on GC opinion, as  it seems to be the first to 
adopt a holistic approach in assessing the predictors of GC opinion by assessing variables that both directly and 
moderately affect GC opinion issuance. Specifically, this study not only tests the direct relationship between 
auditor characteristics and GC opinion issuance, but also assesses the moderating effect of management’s, 
family’s, and institution’s influence on the mentioned relationship. At the time of writing this study, there was 
no known study on the moderating impact of stakeholders’ influence on GC opinion issuance. Furthermore, this 
study has policy implications because the findings could provide an input to the process of developing future 
promulgations as well as refining existing ones. For instance, if this study finds management influence can 
dampen the propensity of specialized auditors to issue a GC opinion, then this finding can be used as one of the 
justifications for policy makers to introduce measures that can curb the practice of management or executives 
to keep significant ownership of a company.   
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. First, we review prior literature and develop hypotheses. In 
sections 3 and 4, we present the research method and findings respectively. Finally, we conclude this paper with 
summary and conclusion.  
 
 
LITERATURE REVIEW AND HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT 
 
Going-Concern Opinion and the Issuance Process 
The applicable ISA 570 (2010) states that GC assumption refers to the notion that an entity is viewed as 
continuing in business for the foreseeable future and management has to prepare a financial statement on a GC 
basis unless the party intends to discontinue business operations or has no other option but to do so. The 
standards also explain that the auditor is responsible (1) for gathering adequate audit evidence about the 
appropriateness of management using a GC assumption in the preparation of the financial statement, and (2) for 
drawing conclusions on the viability of a client company continuing operations. An auditor has to issue a GC 
opinion when there is doubt about a client’s ability to continue operations in the next accounting year. 
Appropriate issuance of a GC opinion by an auditor is seen as an indicator of high audit quality (e.g., Hossain, 
2013; Junaidi et al., 2012; Knechel and Vanstraelen, 2007; Tepalagul and Lin, 2015).  
The process of GC opinion issuance comprises two main stages: (1) recognition, and (2) decision.  In the 
first stage, the auditor is involved in audit activities to ascertain whether the GC assumption can be applied to a 
particular client. The second stage is when the auditor decides on the appropriateness of the GC assumption 
(Mutchler, 1985, 1986). The recognition step depends on auditor competence, i.e., the more competent the 
auditor, the more likely it is that they will be able to detect a client that has characteristics that defy the GC 
assumption. The decision step, which is the second step, relates to auditor independence, i.e., whether the auditor 
is impartial enough to issue a GC opinion if the situation requires them to do so. The idea that the GC opinion  
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process comprises two main stages has empirical support particularly by the findings reported in Kida (1980). 
Specifically, Kida (1980) found that the GC opinion issuance process has two distinct elements, namely, (i) the 
identification of the GC problem and (ii) the issuance of a GC opinion.  
 
The decision stage (stage two) is less straightforward compared to the recognition stage (stage one), as it 
involves negotiations. Before deciding about an audit opinion, an auditor would have to negotiate with parties 
whose interests are affected by the issuance of a GC opinion. The eventual party with whom the auditors would 
have to negotiate extensively is the management, i.e., the party who hired them (Asare, 1990; Behn et al., 2001). 
The negotiation with management may become difficult because the client is a distressed company, and the 
possibility of issuing a GC opinion is brought to the table (Basioudis et al., 2008; Geiger et al., 1998). Any idea 
of departure from the standard or clean audit report would disfavor the management for its potential negative 
consequences to them. In the non-litigious context of Malaysia, the negotiation is more likely to involve owners 
who have a significant interest, i.e., family and institutions.  
The idea of two stages of a GC opinion issuance discussed above frames the hypotheses development 
process below. 
 
Auditor Characteristics 
Auditor Specialization 
Research on the association between auditor specialization and the issuance of a GC opinion to financially 
distressed companies is limited; in fact, only studies by Chiang et al. (2015), Lim and Tan (2008), and Geiger 
and Raghunandan (2002b) can be traced. Even though empirical support on the association between auditor 
specialization and GC opinion is scarce, there are at least two arguments that support a positive association 
between these two variables. The dominant view is the tendency of this kind of auditor to preserve a firm’s 
reputation. Specialized auditors are known to invest in the development of reputation in the market and hence 
would avoid making an error in GC opinion issuance (Abbott and Parker, 2000; Chiang et al., 2015; Lim and 
Tan, 2008). This dominant view is supported by empirical works that discovered that specialized auditors are 
positively associated with compliance with auditing standards (O'Keefe et al., 1994), are associated with more 
effective fraud deterrence (Carcello and Nagy, 2004), and are related to a lower possibility of earning 
management practice (Balsam et al., 2003; Krishnan, 2003). 
Secondly, a specialized auditor is more likely to issue GC opinions appropriately to financially distressed 
companies because they are knowledgeable and hence could provide a higher quality audit compared to non-
specialists (see Abbott and Parker, 2000; Minutti-Meza, 2013). This argument is supported by empirical 
evidence that audit specialists are superior in terms of knowledge and performance compared to auditors that 
do not possess such characteristics (see Owhoso et al., 2002; Solomon et al., 1999). Furthermore, a specialized 
auditor can be related to better identification of GC-related issues for at least two reasons, as suggested by 
Williams (1988). Firstly, audit specialists who are typically associated with auditing many clients in a particular 
industry may have an advantage over other auditors in terms of economies of scale in conducting audits. 
Secondly, a specialized auditor would be more likely to provide effective services because their position as a 
dominant player in the audit market of a particular industry reflects that they have a deep understanding about 
the industry. Hence, H1 is stated as follows: 
 
Hypothesis 1:     Auditor specialization is positively related to issuance of a GC opinion to financially 
distressed companies  
 
Auditor Tenure 
Tepalagul and Lin (2015) and Knechel and Vanstraelen (2007) suggested that audit tenure could positively 
affect both auditor competence and independence. A long tenure could enhance auditor familiarity with the 
client (i.e., become more competent and associated with a greater possibility of issuing a GC opinion to a 
distressed client). In addition, long audit tenure is also associated with more auditor independence because an 
auditor that has provided long service has recovered the initial investment they spent in the early years of service 
(Geiger and Raghunandan, 2002a; Shafie et al., 2009). Conversely, auditors are said to be less independent in 
the early years of providing services because at that time, they spend a lot on the initial investment and may not  
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be willing to act against management’s will (and have their contract terminated for doing so) before the cost can 
be recovered.  
Short audit tenure, on the other hand, would not be associated with the appropriate issuance of a GC 
opinion by an auditor. Knechel and Vanstraelen (2007) argue that audit tenure is negatively associated with both 
auditor’s competence and independence and hence leads to a low possibility of the auditor issuing a GC opinion 
to distressed clients. In addition, short tenure maybe associated with reduced auditor competence because of 
less familiarity with the client’s organization. The authors also suggest that short tenure could hamper auditor 
independence because the auditor may wish to stay longer with the client in order to get back their initial 
investment (which is typically a high level of investment) and hence may sacrifice independence for that reason. 
Furthermore, as stated above, Geiger and Raghunandan (2002a) suggest that an auditor who is in the early years 
of service may act less independently in order to avoid termination of their contract. The market is more likely 
to assume termination in the early years of service is the fault of the auditor, and hence the auditor would avoid 
such damage to their reputation. This leads us to the following hypothesis: 
 
Hypothesis 2:     Auditor tenure is positively related to issuance of a GC opinion to financially distressed 
Companies 
 
Auditor Fees 
There are the operational and financial arguments for the association between audit fee and GC opinion issuance. 
Operationally, it is contended that a high audit fee is associated positively with GC opinion issuance to 
financially distressed clients because when an auditor has to issue a non-unqualified opinion report, they have 
to conduct additional substantive tests, documentation, and discussion and negotiation with the client (Basioudis 
et al., 2008). These additional audit activities are expensive, and a higher audit fee is the result. Empirical 
support for this argument can be seen in early studies on audit fees (see Francis, 1984; Francis and Simon, 1987; 
Simunic, 1980). In contrast, economically, one can expect that the auditor would be less likely to issue a GC 
opinion to a financially distressed client who had paid a substantial audit fee because if the client retaliates by 
terminating the auditor’s contract, the loss of revenue to the auditor would be significant (Vanstraelen, 1999). 
In other words, audit firms may be afraid that they would lose clients if they issued unfavorable opinions. 
Previous literature suggests that there is a relationship between audit fee and GC opinion, but such findings are 
not conclusive on whether such a relationship is positive or negative in nature. We therefore test an non-
directional hypothesis: 
 
Hypothesis 3:    Audit fee is related to issuance of GC opinion to financially distressed companies 
 
Ownership Structure 
Even though an auditor had detected that a client fulfills all the criteria that may cast doubt on their ability to 
continue operations, they would not issue a GC opinion if they were not an independent auditor. In addition, it 
has been stated in the literature that parties like management, family, and institutions are very influential in the 
GC opinion decision process. If a party functions as a catalyst or presses for an independent audit, then the 
auditor would be more likely to issue a GC opinion to a financially distressed client and vice versa (Ballesta 
and Garcia-Meca, 2005; Callaghan et al., 2009). Given the above insights from the literature, this study argues 
that the propensity for an auditor to issue a GC opinion to a financially distressed client is conditional upon the 
extent of other parties’ influence. Thus, this study will test the moderating effect of management, family, and 
institutional influence on the relationship between auditor characteristics and the issuance of a GC opinion. 
To date, to the best of our knowledge, there are no known studies on the moderating effect of 
management, family, and institution on the relationship between auditor characteristics and GC opinion. 
However, there are previous studies in the relevant auditing and accounting fields. 
 
Management Ownership 
Management, or specifically, the CEO of a company, is an important party in the GC opinion issuance process 
because they are “central to the plans firms implement to escape from financial distress” (Ji and Lee, 2015, p.  
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2124). The propensity of an auditor to issue a GC opinion to a financially distressed client is conditional upon 
pressure placed by management, as stated in Callaghan et al. (2009) as the more a GC opinion would negatively 
affect management’s remuneration and the company’s finances, the more management would press the auditor 
not to issue a GC opinion. Callaghan’s contention that management would protect their remuneration is 
supported by a study by Kothari et al., (2009), who discovered that managers would delay the disclosure of bad 
news to protect their remuneration and career from the negative impact of such news. Therefore, we suggest 
that the level of management ownership would probably dampen any positive relationship between auditor 
characteristics and the possibility of a GC opinion issuance to financially distressed companies:  
 
Hypothesis 4: Management ownership weakens the positive relationship between auditor 
specialization and GC opinion issuance. 
Hypothesis 5:    Management ownership weakens the positive relationship between auditor tenure and 
GC opinion issuance. 
Hypothesis 6:  Management ownership affects the relationship between audit fee and GC opinion 
issuance. 
 
Family Ownership 
There is a strong argument that family ownership would positively moderate the relationship between auditor 
characteristics and the issuance of a GC opinion to financially distressed companies. The argument is that a high 
concentration of family ownership may make clients seem’ riskier’ from the perspective of the auditor. The 
empirical support for this argument is provided by Ballesta and Garcia-Meca (2005), who found that family 
owners, if they are on the board of directors, would increase the propensity of the auditor to issue a qualified 
audit opinion. The situation arises because a family business is typically associated with a less independent 
board and with less emphasis on corporate transparency. Ballesta and Garcia-Meca (2005) conducted their study 
in Spain, a country that is similar to Malaysia in terms of high family ownership and a low litigious environment. 
Therefore, we suggest that there is a positive moderation of family ownership on the association between auditor 
characteristics and GC opinion issuance to financially distressed companies. 
 
Hypothesis 7: Family ownership strengthens the positive relationship between auditor specialization 
and GC opinion issuance. 
Hypothesis 8:  Family ownership strengthens the positive relationship between auditor tenure and GC 
opinion issuance.  
Hypothesis 9: Family ownership affects the relationship between audit fee with GC opinion issuance. 
 
Institutional Ownership 
Institutional owners, which typically have a high proportion of ownership, have greater influence compared to 
individual investors (Wan Abdullah et al., 2008). The common understanding about institutional shareholders 
is that they can assert a demand for a high quality audit from the auditor, hence strengthening the effect of 
certain auditor characteristics on the proper GC opinion issuance. The contention that institutional owners would 
demand high audit quality has empirical support, as Kane and Velury (2002) found that the higher proportion 
of institutional ownership, the more likely a company is to be associated with the appointment of a big audit 
firm, the kind of firm which is known to provide high quality audit services. Accordingly, we expect that 
institutional owners would enhance the relationship between auditor characteristics and GC opinion issuance: 
 
Hypothesis 10: Institutional ownership strengthens the positive relationship between auditor 
specialization  and GC opinion issuance.   
Hypothesis 11:   Institutional ownership strengthens the positive relationship between auditor tenure 
and GC opinion issuance. 
Hypothesis 12: Institutional ownership affects the relationship of audit fee and GC opinion issuance. 
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RESEARCH METHODOLGY 
 
Data Collection 
The population of this study is Malaysian public listed companies (PLCs), as these are the kind of companies 
that contribute significantly to the economy and social development of the country. The sample tested in this 
study is financially distressed companies from the PLCs. Distressed companies are taken as the sample because 
ISA 570 mentioned that GC opinion is appropriate to companies that are facing financial problems, and this is 
consistent with prior Malaysian studies in this area (Shafie et al., 2004; Shafie et al., 2009) as well as studies in 
other contexts (Chiang et al., 2015; Geiger and Rama, 2003; Lai, 2009; Mutchler et al., 1997). 
Financially distressed companies included in the sample have two out of the following criteria: (1) net 
liability or a net current liability balance sheet, (2) negative operating cash flows, or (3) substantial operating 
losses. Data were collected from 2006 to 2012; in this study; (an unbalanced) panel data approach is employed 
so that the data acquires many advantages of a panel data regression analysis (see Baltagi, 2001; Gujarati, 2003). 
Distressed companies with the following criteria were excluded from the sample: regulated, utility, and financial 
service companies. Data were collected via secondary sources, namely, Compustat, and Capital IQ databases 
and companies’ annual reports.  
The Datastream and Capital IQ database identify 770 observations that fit the criteria of the sample (Table 
1). Thirty-three observations with no available annual reports and 93 observations with incomplete data were 
excluded. Incomplete data were mostly due to an untraceable CEO name, and/or the ownership level could not 
be traced, or Altman’s z-score could not be calculated due to untraceable items (especially market 
capitalization). This left the study with a usable sample of 644 observations:  
 
Table 1 Sample Selection Process 
Criteria  Number of 
observation 
Population (according to Bursa Malaysia website) 5238 
Observations that fit the criteria of the sample 770 
Excluded because financial reports are not available (33) 
Excluded companies due to incomplete data  (93) 
Usable sample 644 
 
Data Analysis 
Panel logistic regression was used to test the hypotheses of this study. This statistic is used given that the 
dependent variable is nominal (0 = non-GC opinion, 1 = GC opinion). This statistic has been used in prior 
studies on this topic conducted in Malaysia (e.g., Shafie et al., 2004; Shafie et al., 2009) as well as in other 
contexts (e.g., Chiang et al., 2015; Geiger and Raghunandan, 2002a; Geiger et al., 1998; Ji and Lee, 2015). 
Logistic regression is robust; as it does not require a linear relationship between the covariates and the outcome 
variable, there is no requirement for normally distributed independent variables, and it does not assume 
homoscedasticity (Sarkar et al., 2011). When a study involves a panel data logit model with a moderating effect 
(like this study does), it has to run the logistic regression to test all hypotheses using the random effect model 
(REM) approach. The fixed effect model (FEM) approach is not an option because the FEM for logit model 
approach does not produce a group constant term, and this makes the prediction of any interaction effect among 
independent variables impossible (Karaca-Mandic et al., 2012).  
 
Model specification 
The logistic regression model: 
 
GCOP        =  b0 + b1SPECLS + b2TENURE + b3AUDFEE – b4MANINF + b5FAMINF + b6INSTINF – 
b7SPECLS*MANINF –b8TENURE*MANINF – b9AUDFEE*MANINF + b10SPECLS*FAMINF 
+ b11TENURE*FAMINF + b12AUDFEE*FAMINF + b13SPECLS*INSTINF + 
b14TENURE*INSTINF + b15AUDFEE*INSTINF + b16PROBFL + b17NON1STGC + b18DEFULT 
+ b19AUDSIZE - b20CLTSIZE + b21AUSTDD + b22CGSTDD + b23INDS+ e 
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This study has GC opinion issuance (GCOP) as the dependent variable. GCOP is a nominal variable 
indicating whether an auditor has issued a GC opinion to a distressed company or not (GC opinion = 1, else = 
0). The ‘GC opinion’ refers to every type of GC opinion allowable per ISA 570 - unqualified GC opinion with 
emphasis on matter, qualified GC opinion, adverse GC opinion, or disclaimer (Basioudis et al., 2008; Chiang et 
al., 2015; Ji and Lee, 2015). Three auditor characteristics, namely, auditor specialization (SPECLS), auditor 
tenure (TENURE), and audit fee (AUDFEE) are the independent variables. Craswell et al., (1995) proposed that 
the auditing firm is a specialist if it has dominated the audit market share in a particular industry. In this study, 
accordingly, an audit firm that audited 20% or more companies in an industry or sector is coded as a specialist, 
i.e., equal to 1, else is coded as 0 (Chen and Elder, 2001; Mayhew and Wilkins, 2003; Md. Ali et al., 2008).  
Auditor tenure (TENURE) is measured as the number of years an audit firm has audited a particular client 
(Garcia-Blandon and Argiles, 2015; Shafie et al., 2009; Vanstraelen, 2000). The measure reflects exactly how 
long an auditor has provided audit services to a client. The audit fee in Ringgit Malaysia (RM) is used to measure 
the variable AUDFEE (Callaghan et al., 2009; DeFond et al., 2002; Geiger and Rama, 2003).  
The model also includes management influence (MANINF), family influence (FAMINF), and 
institutional influence (INSTINF) as variables that moderate the relationship between the auditor characteristics 
and the issuance of a GC opinion. In this study, management influence is measured as the percentage of shares 
owned by the CEO (both direct and indirect ownership) (Lafond and Roychowdhury, 2008). The CEO is the 
highest-level manager in a company; thus, his percentage of ownership could reflect the influence of 
management in the company as well as in the GC opinion decision process. Family influence is measured as a 
percentage of common shares held by the family that dominates a company (Chau and Leung, 2006). Both direct 
and indirect share ownership are considered. The degree of institutional influence is measured as a percentage 
of ordinary shares owned by institutional investors in a company, and this is possible because this data is 
available in the Capital IQ database.  
Eight variables are controlled, namely, client probability of failure (PROBFL), non-first timer GC 
opinion recipient (NON1STGC), debt default (DEFULT), auditor size (AUDSIZE), client size (CLTSIZE), 
newly issued auditing standard (AUSTDD), newly issued corporate governance code (CGSTDD), and industry 
(INDS). PROBFL is measured using Altman’s z-score (Garcia-Blandon and Argiles, 2015; Sharma and Sidhu, 
2001; Simunic, 1984; Young and Wang, 2010). An auditor might find it is easier to give a GC opinion to a non-
first timer GC opinion recipient (Li, 2009), and an auditor tends to give a GC opinion again (and again) after 
the first time until a company has a certain hope of a turnaround (Mutchler, 1985). This study, therefore, controls 
the effect of NON1STGC in the analysis (non-first timer GC opinion recipient = 1, else = 0). Big firms are more 
likely to issue a GC opinion to financially distressed clients (Berglund et al., 2018). AUDSIZE is measured as 
Big 4 and its local counterparts = 1, and else = 0 (Chiang et al., 2015; Johl et al., 2007; Masyitoh and Adhariani, 
2010; Read, 2015). CLTSIZE is measured through the value of total revenue. 
 There would be an increase in the rate of GC opinion issuance after a new auditing standard is released; 
this happens in the US (Ryu et al., 2009), and in the UK (Citron and Taffler, 2004) and China (DeFond et al., 
1999). Based on the above evidence, this study controls the effect of the release of a new ISA 570, which was 
effective in Malaysia in January 2010. This control variable is named AUSTDD, and the value of 1 is given to 
data after the new ISA 570 was effective, 0 is given to earlier data. The revised Malaysian Code of Corporate 
Governance (MCCG) released in 2007 is more stringent compared to the earlier version, particularly in terms 
of characteristics and function of the audit committee and the internal auditor (see MCCG 2007); thus, there is 
a possibility that it will affect the demand for audit quality (Abdul Wahab et al., 2011). For this reason, this 
study controls the effect of the new MCCG. The control variable was named CGSTDD; the value of 1 is given 
to data after October 1st 2007, and 0 is given to earlier data. Krishnan and Krishnan (1996) found that auditors 
treat companies from different industries differently in the audit-opinion decision process. Industry variable has 
been controlled in previous studies (Geiger et al., 2005). Consequently, the industries or sectors the sample 
companies come from are coded as the control variable named INDS. The independent variables, moderating 
variables, control variables, and measures are as summarized in Table 2. 
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Table 2 Tested variables in the logistic regression model 
Expected 
Sign 
Variables Measures 
+ SPECLS 20% audit market share or more = 1, else = 0 
+ TENURE Number of years an auditor provided audit services to a particular client  
+/- AUDFEE Audit fee 
- MANINF The percentage of shares owned by CEO 
+ FAMINF The percentage of shares owned by dominating family 
+ INSTINF The percentage of shares owned by institutions 
- MANINF_SPECLS The percentage of shares owned by CEO multiplied by SPECLS. 
- MANINF_TENURE The percentage of shares owned by CEO multiplied by TENURE. 
- MANINF_AUDFEE The percentage of shares owned by CEO multiplied by AUDFEE. 
+ FAMINF_SPECLS The percentage of shares owned by dominating family multiplied by SPECLS. 
+ FAMINF_AUDSTEN The percentage of shares owned by dominating family multiplied by TENURE. 
+ FAMINF_AUDFEE The percentage of shares owned by dominating family multiplied by AUDFEE. 
nil INSTINF_SPECLS The percentage of shares owned by institutions multiplied by SPECLS. 
nil INSTINF_AUDSTEN The percentage of shares owned by institutions multiplied by TENURE. 
nil INSTINF_AUDFEE The percentage of shares owned by institutions multiplied by AUDFEE. 
nil PROBFL Altman’s Z-score of current year  
+ NON1STGC Non-first timer GC opinion recipient = 1, else = 0 
+ DEFULT Debt ratio = total liabilities/total assets 
+ AUDSIZE Audited by Big 4 audit firm or the firm’s local counterparts = 1, else = 0 
- CLTSIZE Total revenue 
+ AUSTDD Data on or after January 2010 = 1, else = 0 
+ CGSTDD Data on or after October 2007 = 1, else = 0 
+/- INDS Industry (construction = 1, consumer product = 2, industrial product = 3, 
plantation = 4, properties = 5, technology = 6, trading and services = 7)     
 
 
FINDINGS 
 
Descriptive Analysis     
Table 3 presents the descriptive statistics of the sample. The table shows data of both before and after 
winsorization at the 1% level (continuous data only - 4 highest and 4 lowest points of data). The data prior to 
winsorization might offer an unrealistic view about the sample because they contain extreme values and/or 
outliers: 
 
Table 3: All Variables 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
GCOP .20 .3980 0 1 
     
SPECLS .250 .4330 0 1 
TENURE 4.110 1.8270 1 6 
AUDFEE 154728.060 204695.890 10000 1673000 
     
MANINF .180 .2019 .00 .83 
FAMINF .231 .2755 .00 .93 
INSTINF .082 .1279 .00 .72 
     
PROBFL .480 2.9789 -11.99 16.15 
NON1STGC .110 .3190 0 1 
DEFULT 62.360 42.4143 2.020 329.200 
AUDSIZE .430 .4950 0 1 
CLTSIZE 389.030 1287.2055 .00 11266.49 
AUSTDD .450 .4980 0 1 
CGSTDD .740 .4370 0 1 
INDS 5.710 3.8960 1 7 
     
 
Note: GCOP = GC opinion (1,0). PROBFL = Probability of failure (z-score). SPECLS = Auditor specialization (1,0). TENURE = Auditor 
tenure. AUDFEE = Audit fee. MANINF = Management ownership. FAMINF = Family ownership. INSTINF = Institutional ownership. 
NON1STGC = Non first-timer GC opinion recipient (1,0). DEFULT = Debt default. AUDSIZE = Auditor size (1,0). CLTSIZE = Client 
size. AUSTDD = Auditing standard (1,0). CGSTDD = Corporate governance standard (1,0). INDS = Industries. 
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As shown in Table 3, the mean of the independent variable GCOP is 0.20, which means that Malaysian 
auditors issue a GC opinion to around only 20% of seriously financially distressed Malaysian PLCs. Due to a 
stricter sample selection procedure (i.e. this study selected companies that were experiencing severe financial 
problems in contrast to prior studies in this area), this rate of GC opinion issuance is higher in comparison to 
the GC opinion issuance rate as reported in a recent Malaysian study by Abdul Wahab et al. (2013), which is 
only at 6.3%. It is also higher compared to studies in other countries like Lim and Tan (2008), DeFond et al. 
(2002), and Reynolds and Francis (2001), who reported report values of 7%, 9% and 8%, respectively.  
For this sample of 644 financially distressed companies (observations), only 25% of them had been 
audited by a specialized auditor (SPECLS). The average auditor tenure (TENURE) is 4.11 years (min = 1 and 
max = 6). On average, these financially distressed companies paid RM154,728.08 in audit fees (AUDFEE) to 
their auditor ranging from RM10,000 to RM1,673,000 (SD = 204695.89). The mean for management ownership 
(MANINF) and family ownership (FAMINF) are 18% and 23% respectively. MANINF ranges from 0 to 83%, 
and FAMINF ranges from 0 to 93%. The Capital IQ database provides data about INSTINF (institutional 
ownership), and on average, it is at 8.2% for the sample companies (min = 0, max = 72%, SD = .128).  
Descriptive statistics for control variables are also presented in Table 3. The average score of possibility 
of failure for the sample companies (z-score) is 0.48, with scores ranging from -11.99 to 16.15 (SD = 2.979). 
The average for every company is well below 1.8, which is the benchmark point of Altman’s z-score and which 
means there is a high likelihood that a company would collapse (Thai, Goh, Teh, Wong, & Ong, 2014). For 
variable non-first timer GC opinion recipients (NON1STGC), 11% of sample companies/observations are non-
first timer GC opinion recipients, i.e., have received the same audit opinion in the immediate prior year. The 
third control variable debt default (DEFULT), measured as leverage (total liabilities/total assets), has an average 
of 62.36% (min = 2.02%, max = 329.20%). For audit size (ADSIZE), around 43% of sample companies are 
audited by big firms. The size of sample observations (CLTSIZE) ranged from RM0 to RM11.266 billion in 
sales revenue (average RM389.03 million). Forty five percent of sample companies are in the period of a later 
ISA570 (AUSTDD), and 74% of the sample companies are in the period when newer MCCG is effective. INDS 
is a nominal data for industry classification, and therefore, its mean, standard deviation, and minimum and 
maximum data as revealed in Table 3 are meaningless. 
 
Diagnostic Tests 
The three most common protocols for multivariate regression diagnostics are checking for outliers, normality, 
and multicollinearity. Research shows that the presence of outliers has only a benign effect on the result of 
logistic regression; however, it is commonly accepted that “deleting cases with the largest residuals or more 
extreme values almost always improves the fit of the model” (Sarkar et al., 2011, p. 34). To obtain a better fit 
of model as mentioned above, this study winsorizes the data at the 1% level. Logistic regression does not require 
normally distributed independent variables (Bewick, Cheek, & Ball, 2005; Peng, Lee, & Ingersoll, 2002). 
Multivariate logistic regression is also sensitive to multicollinearity between independent variables in a tested 
model (Hosmer Jr, Lemeshow, & Sturdivant, 2013). Table 4 below shows that the highest correlation among 
variables in this study is between SPECLS and AUDSIZE; this is at .635**, which is below 0.70 and thus 
indicates no possible multicollinearity problem is present (Anderson et al., 1996).  
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Table 4 Pearson Correlation (N = 644) 
 
 
G
C
O
P
 
S
P
E
C
L
S
 
T
E
N
U
R
E
 
A
U
D
F
E
E
 
M
A
N
IN
F
 
F
A
M
IN
F
 
 
IN
S
T
IN
F
 
 
P
R
O
B
F
L
 
N
O
N
IS
T
G
C
 
D
E
F
U
L
T
 
A
U
D
S
IZ
E
 
C
L
T
S
IZ
E
 
U
S
T
D
D
 
C
G
S
T
D
D
 
IN
D
S
 
GCOP 1               
SPECLS -.034 1              
TENURE .016 .241** 1             
AUDFEE .030 .105** .150** 1            
MANINF -.065 .083* .061 -.056 1           
FAMINF -.046 .097* .091* -.019 .558** 1          
INSTINF -.048 .030 .028 .246** -.119** -.167** 1         
PROBFL -.378** .059 .096* -.021 .003 .062 .026 1        
NON1STGC .617** -.028 -.039 .028 -.030 -.030 -.066 -.311** 1       
DEFULT .380** -.054 -.080* .057 -.032 -.053 -.010 -.534** .321** 1      
AUDSIZE -.040 .635** .385** .205** -.048 .025 .095* .089* -.024 -.098* 1     
CLTSIZE -.071 .091* .142** .481** -.027 -.005 .185** .106** -.070 .038 .179** 1    
AUSTDD .061 -.155** .080* .120** -.077* -.030 .050 .078* .085* -.059 -.116** .045 1   
CGSTDD .130** -.162** .154** .094* -.038 -.008 .075 .027 .100* -.028 -.135** .026 .531** 1  
INDS .089* .047 -.041 .194** -.087* -.161** .045 .008 .063 -.026 .029 .037 .072 .080* 1 
Note: ** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). * Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).PROBFL = Client 
probability of failure (z-score). SPECLS = Auditor specialization (1,0). TENURE = Auditor tenure. AUDFEE = Audit fee. MANINF = 
Management ownership. FAMINF = Family ownership. INSTINF = Institutional ownership. NON1STGC = Non first-timer GC opinion 
recipient (1,0). DEFULT = Debt default. AUDSIZE = Auditor size (1,0). CLTSIZE = Client size. AUSTDD = Auditing standard (1,0). 
CGSTDD = Corporate governance standard (1,0). INDS = Industries. 
 
Univariate Analysis 
This study used a t-test for continuous variables and a chi-square test for categorical variables to test between-
group differences (independent groups of GC opinion recipients and non-GC opinion recipients). In this study, 
eight continuous variables were tested against the dependent variable GC opinion – TENURE, AUDFEE, 
MANINF, FAMINF, INSTINF, PROBFL, DEFULT and CLTSIZE. The result of the t-test is summarized 
below in Table 5: 
     
Table 5 Univariate Tests for Continues Variables 
    GC companies 
VS Non-GC 
companies 
 Total sample 
(N = 644) 
GC companies  
(N = 127) 
Non-GC companies  
(N = 517) 
t-test 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. t-stat p-value 
TENURE 4.110 1.827 4.170 1.890 4.100 1.812 .401 .688 
AUDFEE 
154728.060 204695.890 167194.780 129795.652 151665.640 
219206.92
3 
.766 .444 
MANINF .180 .202 .156 .195 .188 .203 -1.642 .101 
FAMINF .231 .276 .203 .267 .235 .278 -1.169 .243 
INSTINF .082 .128 .063 .117 .079 .130 -1.230 .219 
PROBFL .480 2.979 -1.788 3.270 1.041 2.621 -9.061 .000 
DEFULT 62.360 42.414 94.813 57.183 54.388 33.472 7.651 .000 
CLTSIZE 389.030 1287.206 204.644 436.722 434.321 1416.935 -3.130 .002 
Note: TENURE = Auditor tenure. AUDFEE = Audit fee. MANINF = Management ownership. FAMINF = Family ownership. INSTINF = 
Institutional ownership. PROBFL = Probability of client failure (z-score). DEFULT = Debt default. CLTSIZE = Client size.  
 
As seen in the table above, no significant difference between GC opinion recipient and non-recipient 
groups has been detected for variable auditor tenure (TENURE), audit fee (AUDFEE), management ownership 
(MANINF), family ownership (FAMINF), and institutional ownership (INSTINF). The t-test result, however, 
shows that there are significant differences between groups of GC opinion compared to non-GC opinion 
recipients for three continuous control variables, namely, the probability of client failure (PROBFL), debt 
default (DEFULT), and client size (CLTSIZE). Specifically, for the variable client probability of failure 
(PROBFL), there is a significant difference in the Altman’s z-scores for GC opinion recipients (M=-1.788, 
SD=3.270) and non-GC opinion recipients (Mean =1.041, SD=2.621); t (167.873) = -9.061, p = 0.000. This 
shows that the group of GC recipients has a high probability of client failure compared to the group of non-GC 
opinion recipients. For DEFULT, there is a significant difference in the tendency of facing debt default for GC 
opinion clients (M = 94.8130, SD = 57.1829) and non-GC opinion clients (M = 54.3884, SD = 33.4724); t 
(147.848) = 7.651, p = 0.000. For CLTSIZE, GC opinion clients (M = 204.644, SD = 436.722) and non-GC  
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opinion clients (M = 434.321, SD = 1416.935); t (615.376) = -3.130, p = 0.002, and this shows that the GC 
recipients’ group contains smaller companies compared to the non-GC recipients’ group.  
Six categorical variables were tested against the dependent variable GC opinion, and the result of the chi 
square test is summarized below: 
 
Table 6 Univariate Tests for Dichotomous Variables 
    GC companies VS 
Non-GC 
companies 
 
Total sample (N = 644) GC companies (N = 127) 
Non-GC companies (N = 
517) 
Chi square test 
Variable 
n (%) n (%) n (%) 
Pearson chi 
square (df) 
P 
SPECLS 161 (25.0%) 28 (22.0%) 133 (25.7%) .736 (1) .391 
NON1STGC 74 (11.5%) 65 (51.2%) 9 (1.7%) 245.039 (1) .000 
AUDSIZE 274 (42.5%) 49 (38.6%) 225 (43.5%) 1.017 (1) .313 
AUSTDD 290 (45.0%) 65 (51.2%) 225 (43.5%) 2.417 (1) .120 
CGSTDD 479 (74.4%) 109 (85.8%) 370 (71.5%) 10.879 (1) .001 
INDS N/A N/A N/A 32.496 (6) .000 
Note: SPECLS = Auditor specialization (1,0). NON1STGC = Non first-timer GC opinion recipient (1,0). AUDSIZE = Auditor size 
(1,0). AUSTDD = Auditing standard (1,0). CGSTDD = Corporate governance standard (1,0). INDS = Industries.  
 
As seen in Table 6, this study observed no association between the SPECLS and the GC opinion issuance, 
χ2(1) = 0.736, p = 0.391. It shows that specialized auditors and non-specialized auditors did not differ in terms 
of tendency to issue a GC opinion to financially distressed companies. For the control variable non-first time 
GC opinion receiver (NON1STGC), the table shows that from the total sample of 644 companies, 74 companies 
or 11.5% were given a GC opinion by auditors in the year before the observed year. For GC companies, 65 out 
of 127 (51.2%) had received a GC opinion a year before and for the group of non GC opinion companies, 9 out 
of 517 companies (1.7%) had been given a GC opinion in the previous year. This study observed a strong 
association between the NON1STGC and the GC opinion issuance, χ2(1) = 245.039, p = .000. 
Two other control variables, namely, auditor size (AUDSIZE) and auditing standard (AUSTDD) were 
found to have no significant association with GC opinion issuance, at χ2(1) = 1.017, p = .313 and χ2(1) = 2.417, 
p = .120 respectively. For variable corporate governance standard (CGSTDD), however, there is a strong 
association between the variable with GC opinion issuance, χ2(1) = 10.879, p = 0.001, suggesting that the rate 
of GC opinion issuance is significantly higher after the release of MCCG (2007) compared to the period before 
that. The variable industry (INDS) also shows a significant result, χ2(6) = 32.496, p = 0.000. This indicates that 
auditors issue GC opinions to different industries at different rates.  
 
Results of the logistic regression 
Table 7 below presents the results of the panel logistic regressions (random effect). The model presented in the 
table has a likelihood ratio of 290.068 (p > 0.01) indicating that the model fits the data very well. The model is 
an acceptable one where the H-L test yielded an X2(8) of 13.155 and is insignificant (p > 0.10). The McFadden 
R2 for the model reported below it is 45.3 percent. The R2 is higher compared to a study on the moderation 
effect of auditor specialization on the direct relationship between auditor fee and GC opinion performed by Lim 
and Tan (2008), who obtained R2 = 38.7%. 
 
Table 7 Panel Logistic Regression (Random Effect Model) Dependent Variable = GCOP, N = 644 
Hypothesis and Variables  Predicted signs  Coefficient (z-statistic) Prob. 
Intercept ?  -5.024 (-6.537) *** 
Independent variables     
H1 SPECLS +  1.065 (1.566)  
H2 TENURE +  0.245 (1.675) * 
H3 AUDFEE +/-  1.90E-06 (1.308)  
     
MANINF -  5.561 (2.605) *** 
FAMINF +  -2.765 (-1.934) * 
INSTINF +   5.003 (1.189)  
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Table 7 Cont. 
Moderating effect     
H4 SPECLS*MANINF -  -5.458 (-2.372) ** 
H5 TENURE*MANINF -  -1.299 (-2.554) ** 
H6 AUDFEE*MANINF -  1.04E-06 (0.212)  
H7 SPECLS*FAMINF +  0.934 (0.667)  
H8 TENURE*FAMINF  +  0.754 (2.171) ** 
H9 AUDFEE*FAMINF +  -1.68E-06 (-0.443)  
H10 SPECLS*INSTINF +  -2.470 (-0.811)  
H11 TENURE*INSTINF +  -0.570 (-0.590)  
H12 AUDFEE*INSTINF +  -1.01E-05 (-1.145)  
Control variables     
PROBFL Nil  -0.491 (-4.213) *** 
NON1STGC +  3.591 (8.286) *** 
DEFULT +  0.008 (2.051) ** 
AUDSIZE +  -0.185 (-0.435)  
CLTSIZE -  -0.000 (-0.806)  
AUSTDD +  -0.097 (-0.301)  
CGSTDD +  1.000 (2.349) ** 
INDS +/-  0.045 (1.146)  
     
Likelihood Ratio Statistic (p)   290.068 (0.000)  
McFadden R-squared   0.453  
H & L [X2(8)] (p)   13.155 (0.107)  
Note: *** p< 0.01, ** p < 0.05 and *p < 0.10. SPECLS = Auditor specialization (1,0). TENURE = Auditor tenure. AUDFEE = Audit fee. 
MANINF = Management ownership. FAMINF = Family ownership. INSTINF = Institutional ownership. AUDFEEX = Client probability 
of failure (z-score). NON1STGC = Non first-timer GC opinion recipient (1,0). DEFULT = Debt default. AUDSIZE = Auditor size (1,0). 
CLTSIZE = Client size. AUSTDD = Auditing standard (1,0). CGSTDD = Corporate governance standard (1,0). INDS = Industries. 
 
Objective 1 – Auditor Characteristics Association with GC Opinion Issuance (Hypothesis 2, 3 and 4) 
The first objective of this study is to ascertain the impact of auditor characteristics in terms of specialization 
(SPECLS), tenure (TENURE), and fee (AUDFEE) on the issuance of a GC opinion. Table 7 shows that only 
TENURE has a significant positive relationship with GC opinion issuance at the 0.10 level, but with a z-statistic 
of 1.675 only, i.e., less than 2.000.  The z-statistic is less than 2, i.e., the coefficient of the variable is seen as 
meaningless (LogisticRegressionAnalysis.com, 2013), thus showing that there is no support for Hypothesis 2. 
Unexpectedly, this study finds that SPECLS is not significant in predicting GC opinion issuance, and thus, 
Hypothesis 1 is not supported. This strengthens the previous literature’s contention that regardless of the level 
of specialization, while all auditors might know that a company has a GC problem, other factors would alter 
their propensity to issue GC opinion. This finding is consistent with the discovery reported in Chiang et al. 
(2015) and Geiger and Raghunandan (2002b).  
Table 7 also shows that AUDFEE is not significant in predicting GC opinion issuance; thus, there is no 
support for Hypothesis 3. This result is consistent with a number of previous studies (Callaghan et al., 2009; 
DeFond et al., 2002; Read, 2015). However, the finding that AUDFEE has no significant relationship with GC 
opinion issuance is inconsistent with Geiger and Rama (2003), who found a positive association between audit 
fee and GC opinion.  
 
Objective 2 – Assess the Moderating Effect of Management, Family, and Institution on the Association 
between Auditor Characteristics and GC Opinion Issuance (Hypothesis 4 to Hypothesis 12) 
The second objective of this study is to assess the moderating effect of the influence of management (MANINF), 
family (FAMINF), and institution (INSTINF) on the relationship between auditor characteristics and the 
auditor’s decision to issue a GC opinion (GCOP). Hypotheses 4 to 6 are related to the moderating effect of 
management influence (MANINF) on the direct relationship between auditor characteristics (SPECLS, 
TENURE and AUDFEE) and GC opinion (GCOP). The coefficient for SPECLS*MANINF is negative and 
significantly related to GCOP (z = -2.372, p < 0.05). The evidence is consistent with the prediction in Hypothesis 
4.  
The coefficient for TENURE*MANINF is also negative and has a significant relationship with GCOP (z 
= 2.554, p < 0.05), showing support for Hypothesis 5. The result suggests that the possibility of a specialist 
auditor and a long tenure auditor issuing a GC opinion can be dampened by the level of management ownership. 
Management would not like an auditor to issue a GC opinion because such an opinion would negatively affect  
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the company’s financial condition and consequently affect management’s remuneration (see Callaghan et al., 
2009). This evidence is in tandem with findings reported in Koh and Lee (2018). These researchers discovered 
that CEO conduct can affect the propensity of an auditor to issue a GC opinion.   However, no support is seen 
for Hypothesis 6, as no significant relationship is found between AUDFEE*MANINF and GC opinion.  
Hypotheses 7 to 9 are related to the moderating effect of family influence (FAMINF) on the direct 
relationship between auditor characteristics (SPECLS, TENURE and AUDFEE) and GC opinion (GCOP). 
Table 7 shows that only the coefficient of interaction between auditor tenure and family ownership 
(TENURE*FAMINF) is positive, and it is significantly related to GC opinion issuance (z = 2.171, p < 0.05), 
indicating that Hypothesis 8 is supported.  The result shows that the positive relationship between TENURE 
and GC opinion can be strengthened by the level of family ownership. The result suggests that the presence of 
a high level of family ownership is associated with the high possibility of an auditor with longer tenure issuing 
a GC opinion. The coefficients of interaction between auditor specialization and family ownership 
(SPECLS*FAMINF) and audit fee and family ownership (AUDFEE*FAMINF) are not significant in predicting 
GC opinion issuance. Thus, there is no support for Hypothesis 7 and Hypothesis 9 respectively. This means that 
a dominant family has no influence over the probability that (i) an auditor that is specialized or not and (ii) an 
auditor that charges a high or a low fee would issue a GC opinion. 
Hypotheses 10 to 12 are related to the moderating effect of institutional influence (INSTINF) on the 
direct relationship between auditor characteristics (SPECLS, TENURE and AUDFEE) and GC opinion 
(GCOP). The coefficients of SPECLS*INSTINF, TENURE*INSTINF and AUDFEE*INSTINF have no 
significant relationship with GCOP, and these show no support for Hypothesis 10, Hypothesis 11, or Hypothesis 
12 respectively. Malaysian institutional investors, which are mostly government-linked organizations 
(particularly Khazanah Holdings, Lembaga Tabung Haji and Employee Providence Fund), are not active control 
mechanisms and thus would not influence the GC opinion issuance. Several Malaysian empirical works on 
institutional ownership have found that institutional owners in this country have these characteristics. Wan 
Hussin et al., (2009) and Haniffa and Cooke (2002), for instance, found that the level of institutional ownership 
has no effect on the degree of compliance to compulsory accounting disclosure.  In addition, Bamahros and 
Wan Hussin (2015) found recent evidence that for Malaysian companies, the percentage of institutional 
ownership has no positive association with discretionary accruals, indicating that institutional owners are not 
effective monitors of the accounting and auditing process.  
  
Other Independent Variables 
To detect the moderating effect of MANINF, FAMINF, and INSTINF on the relationship between auditor 
characteristics and the issuance of GC opinion, one has to include these three ownership level variables in the 
regression model as independent variables (Kenny, 2015). Results presented in Table 7 show that MANINF has 
a positive relationship with GC opinion issuance (z = 2.605, p < 0.01), but not FAMINF and INSTINF. This 
indicates that management is an influential party in an audit opinion issuance process. This is in contrast to the 
findings reported by Mohd Iskandar et al. (2011), who found that management ownership is negatively related 
to the issuance of GC opinion; however, this difference in findings might be due to Mohd Iskandar et al.’s study 
being a one-year cross sectional study with a smaller sample size.  
 
Control Variables 
Table 7 also highlights the result of analysis on the relationship between GCOP (dependent variable) and eight 
control variables, namely, client probability of failure (PROBFL), non-first timer GC opinion recipient 
(NON1STGC), debt default (DEFULT), auditor size (AUDSIZE), client size (CLTSIZE), newly issued auditing 
standard (AUSTDD), newly issued corporate governance code (CGSTDD), and industry (INDS). The results 
show that only the control variables PROBFL, NON1STGC, DEFULT, and CGSTDD are significant and have 
positive signs. PROBFL is negative and significant at the 0.01 level (z = -4.213). NON1STG is positive and 
significant at the 0.01 level (z = 8.286). The positive association between NON1STGC and GC opinion shows 
that a company would more likely be given a GC opinion by an auditor if it has been given such an opinion 
during the past financial year. DEFULT and CGSTDD are also positively significant in predicting GC opinion 
albeit at the 5% level only (z = 2.051 and z = 2.349 respectively).  
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Robustness and Sensitivity Tests 
To test the credibility of the main findings, we reran the logistic regression test using an alternative proxy for 
the tested variable client size (CLTSIZE). The main findings reported in Table 7 used ‘total revenue’ as the 
proxy for CLTSIZE, but in this robustness test, the proxy used for the variable is ‘total assets’. The result of this 
robustness test is consistent with the main findings as reported in Table 7 and supports Hypotheses 4 and 5 (see 
Appendix 1). The only disagreement is Hypothesis 8 whereby in the main findings, the hypothesis is supported, 
but in this robustness test, no such support can be detected. To be specific, the relationship between the variable 
moderating effect of family ownership on the relationship between auditor tenure and GC opinion issuance 
(TENURE*FAMINF) is positive and significant as expected, but the z-statistic is less than 2, which shows that 
the coefficient of the variable is meaningless. The consistency between the main findings and the robustness 
test findings shows no indication that the main findings are not credible.   
We also conducted a sensitivity analysis to examine whether the main findings are receptive to the 
effect of an economic downturn. The World Bank’s records show that between 2006 to 2012 (the period covered 
by the sample of this study), Malaysia experienced negative GDP growth when the US sub-prime crisis occurred 
in 2009, i.e., at -1.514 percent (The World Economic Bank, 2016). We compared the results of analysis for (1) 
the period of economic downturn and after (i.e., 2009-2012) and (2) the main findings (2006-2012). Note that 
the CGSTDD control variable was excluded from the analysis of the 2009 to 2012 data because it had no 
variation in the period (the variable is defined as data on or after October 2007, i.e., the release of MCCG2007 
= 1, else = 0). The inclusion of the variable would cause singular covariance, i.e., the coefficient is not unique, 
and hence, a logistic panel regression could not be run. We found that the result of data analysis during an 
economic downturn is almost identical to the result of the main analysis reported earlier in Table 7 (see 
Appendix 2). This indicates that (i) in the context of Malaysia, the predictors of GC opinion issuance are not 
sensitive to economic fluctuation, and (ii) the main findings reported in Table 7 are still valid and robust. 
 
 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
 
In summary, in this study, 12 hypotheses have been tested using logistic regression. The first objective of the 
study is related to the testing of the relationship between three auditor characteristics (namely, specialization in 
Hypothesis 1, tenure in Hypothesis 2 and audit fee in Hypothesis 3) and the issuance of a GC opinion. The 
analysis produces no support for Hypotheses 1, 2, and 3, indicating that auditor characteristics are not the 
determinants of a GC opinion issuance in Malaysia. Objective 2 of the study is related to the assessment of the 
moderating effect of management (Hypotheses 4 to 6), family (Hypotheses 7 to 9), and institutional influence 
(Hypotheses 10 to 12) on the relationship between auditor characteristics and GC opinion issuance. The result 
of the logistic regression shows that there is evidence that management ownership impairs the relationship 
between auditor characteristics and GC opinion issuance (Hypotheses 4 and 5 are supported) whereas family 
ownership strengthens the relationship (Hypothesis 8 is supported), and, unexpectedly, institutional ownership 
has no effect on such a relationship (Hypotheses 10 to 12 are not supported). Robustness and sensitivity analyses 
have been conducted, and the results of these analyses show that the main finding of this study is credible and 
robust. 
Overall, it can be concluded that the concern raised by FSRC of MIA and Zarinah Anwar of SEC Malaysia 
about there being a high number of financially distressed companies in Malaysia but only a few had received 
GC opinion is true. It is true because this study has found that auditors in this country issued a GC opinion to 
only around 20 percent of seriously financially distressed companies. It can also be concluded that in the context 
of Malaysia, auditor characteristics almost do not differentiate the possibility of GC opinion issuance, but 
pressure imposed by management, family, and institutions on the auditor during the audit opinion decision 
process - measured as the level of their ownership - does have an impact. These research findings partially 
support the agency theory explanation about the interaction between auditor and owners in the GC opinion 
issuance process.  
Even though the current study is an advance compared to previous studies on the topic, it is limited by at least 
two restrictions. Firstly, there are several types of GC opinion, namely, unqualified (with an emphasis on 
matter), qualified, adverse, and disclaimer, but they are all treated as one in this research analysis (coded as GC 
opinion = 1, else = 0). The method of giving 1 and 0 value to all types of GC opinion and others respectively  
686 
 
International Journal of Economics and Management 
 
 
has been criticized as simplistic (see Young and Wang, 2010) because it does not reflect the degree of 
seriousness of the GC problem. The only reason different types of audit opinions are not coded differently in 
this study is because certain types of GC opinion (particularly the disclaimer and adverse opinion) are rarely 
issued in Malaysia. Secondly, this study tests the effect of auditor specialization on the issuance of GC opinion, 
but not audit-team specialization and regional specialization because data related to these two concepts are not 
readily available. Audit-team specialization rather than firm specialization (Schroeder et al., 1986) and/or 
auditor specialization at a regional instead of at a national level could significantly predict GC opinion issuance 
(Cenker and Nagy, 2008).  
The findings of this study have enriched the literature on GC opinion issuance, but the research approach and 
topics that can be explored further in this area are far from exhaustive. Firstly, this research can be extended by 
using a qualitative research paradigm and method. This will enable us to understand in greater depth the process 
behind a GC opinion issuance decision. Secondly, future studies should expand to explore the effect of other 
predictors of GC opinion issuance (e.g., client age and control environment). Furthermore, some predictor 
variables in this study can be tested further by refining the research design. For instance, for auditor tenure, a 
smaller unit of analysis can be used, i.e., future research can test the impact of audit partner tenure instead of 
audit firm tenure. Thirdly, the accuracy of the GC opinion issuance and its outcomes (e.g., funding difficulties 
and client operational failure) should also be explored.  
 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT 
The first author is supported by a research grant of the Universiti Putra Malaysia no. GP/2017/9563000. 
 
 
REFERENCES 
 
Abbott, L. J. and Parker, S. (2000), “Auditor selection and audit committee characteristics”, Auditing: A Journal of 
Practice & Theory, Vol. 19 No.2, pp. 47-66. 
Abdul Wahab, E. A., Mat Zain, M. and Abdul Rahman, R. (2013), “Political connections, fees paid to auditors and 
auditor independence in Malaysia: evidence from going concern audit opinion”, International Journal of 
Accounting, Auditing and Performance Evaluation, Vol. 9 No. 2, pp. 153-183. 
Abdul Wahab, E. A., Mat Zain, M. and James, K. (2011), “Audit fees in Malaysia: Does corporate governance 
matter?”, Asian Academy of Management Journal of Accounting and Finance, Vol. 7 No. 1, pp. 1-27. 
Accountants Today (December 2009), Financial reporting: Concern over 'Going concern'?, pp. 18-21. 
Accountants Today (February 2007), Wake-up call, pp. 10-16. 
Accountants Today (May orJune 2012), Upholding financial feporting quality, pp. 22-26. 
Accountants Today (November 2010), Financial Statements Review Committee (FSRC) key observations, pp. 26-30. 
Accountants Today (November, 2009), Lessons from deficient disclosure, pp. 14-17. 
Amin, K., Krishnan, J. and Yang, J. S. (2014), “Going concern opinion and cost of equity”, Auditing: A Journal of 
Practice & Theory, Vol. 33 No. 4, pp. 1-39. 
Anderson, D., Sweeney, D. and Williams, T. (1996). Statistics for busniess and economics (6th ed.): West Publishing 
Co. 
Anwar, Z. (2004), The future of capital markets-evolving challenges for the Malaysian accounting profession. Speech 
by Deputy Chief Executive, Securities Commission. 46th MICPA Anniversary Commemorative Lecture, 2 
December, 2007. Renaissance Hotel. Available at: http://www.sc.com.my. 
Anwar, Z. (2007), Speech by Chairman of Securities Commission at the Malaysian Institute of Accountant Launching 
of Financial Reporting Standard Implementation Committee, 30 January, 2007, Available at: 
http://www.sc.com.my. 
Asare, S. K. (1990), “The auditor's going-concern decisions: A review and implications for future research”, Journal 
of Accounting Literature, Vol. 9, pp. 39-64. 
687 
 
The Impact of Management, Family, and Institution on The Auditor’s Going Concern Opinion Issuance Decision 
 
 
Asia One Business News (2015), Deloitte yet to audit 1MDB’s financial year Retrieved November 18, 2015, from 
http://business.asiaone.com/news/deloitte-yet-audit-1mdb%E2%80%99s-financial-year 
Ballesta, J. P. S. and Garcia-Meca, E. (2005), “Audit qualifications and corporate governance in Spanish listed firms”, 
Managerial Auditing Journal, Vol. 20 No. 7, pp. 725-738. 
Balsam, S., Krishnan, J. and Yang, J. (2003) “Auditor industry specialization and earnings quality”, Auditing: A 
Journal of Practice & Theory, Vol. 22 No. September, pp. 71-97. 
Baltagi, B. (2001), Econometric analysis of panel data (2nd ed.), Chicester: John Wiley and Sons. 
Bamahros, H. M. and Wan Hussin, W. N. (2015), “Types of institutional investors and earnings management in 
Malaysia”, Advanced Science Letters, Vol. 21 No. 6, pp. 2003-2006. 
Basioudis, I. G., Papakonstantinou, E. and Geiger, M. A. (2008), “Audit fees, non-audit fees and auditor going-
concern reporting decisions in the United Kingdom”, ABACUS, Vol. 44 No. 3, pp. 284-309. 
Behn, B. K., Kaplan, S. E. and Krumwiede, K. R. (2001), “Further evidence on the auditor's going-concern report: 
The influence of management plans”, Auditing: A Journal of Practice & Theory, Vol. 20 No. 1, pp. 13-28. 
Berglund, N. R., Eshleman, J. D. and Guo, P. (2018), “Auditor Size and Going Concern Reporting”, Auditing: A 
Journal of Practice & Theory, Vol. 37 No. 2, pp. 1-25. 
Bewick, V., Cheek, L. and Ball, J. (2005), “Statistic review 14: logistic regression”. Critical Care, Vol. 9 No. 1, pp. 
112-118. 
Blay, A. D. and Geiger, M. A. (2001), “Market expectations for first-time going-concern recipients”, Journal of 
Accounting, Auditing & Finance, Vol. 17, pp. 209-226. 
Boone, J. P., Khurana, I. K. and Raman, K. (2010), “Do the big 4 and second-tier firms provide audits of similar 
quality?’, Journal of Accounting and Public Policy, Vol. 29, pp. 330-352. 
Bursa Malaysia Securities Berhad (2009), Practice Note 17 - Criteria and obligation of PN17 companies, BMSB. 
Callaghan, J., Parkash, M. and Singhal, R. (2009), “Going-concern audit opinions and provision of nonaudit services: 
Implications for auditor independence of bankrupt firms”, Auditing: A Journal of Practice & Theory, Vol. 28 
No. 1, pp. 153-169. 
Carcello, J. V. and Nagy, A. L. (2004), “Client size, auditor specialization and fraudulent financial reporting”, 
Managerial Auditing Journal, Vol. 19, pp. 651-668. 
Carcello, J. V. and Neal, T. L. (2003), “Audit committee characteristics and auditor dismissals following 'new' going-
concern reports”, The Accounting Review, Vol. 78 No. 1, pp. 95-117. 
Cenker, W. J. and Nagy, A. L. (2008), “Auditor resignations and auditor industry specialization”, Accounting 
Horizons, Vol. 22 No. 3, pp. 279-295. 
Chau, G, & Leung, P. (2006). The impact of board composition and family ownership on audit committee formation: 
Evidence from Hong Kong. Journal of Accounting, Auditing and Taxation, 15, 1-15.  
Chen, K Y, & Elder, R J. (2001). Industry specialization and audit fees: The effect of industry type and market 
definition. Working Paper. National Cheng Kung University and Syracuse University.  
Chiang, H. T., Lin, S. L. and He, L. J. (2015), “Implications of auditor characteristics and directors' and officers' 
liability insurance for going-concern audit opinions: evidence from Taiwan”, International Business Research, 
Vol. 8 No. 5, pp. 130-145. 
Citron, D. B. and Taffler, R. J. (2004), “The comparative impact of an audit report standard and an audit going-
concern standard on going-concern disclosure rates”, Auditing: A Journal of Practice & Theory, Vol. 23 No. 2, 
pp. 119-130. 
Citron, D. B., Taffler, R. J. and Uang, J. (2008), “Delays in reporting price-sensitive information: The case of going-
concern”, Journal of Accounting and Public Policy, Vol. 27, pp. 19-37. 
Craswell, A. T. (1988), “The association between qualified opinions and auditor switches”, Accounting and Business 
Research, Vol. 19 No. Winter, pp. 23-31. 
 
688 
 
International Journal of Economics and Management 
 
 
DeFond, M. L., Raghunandan, K. and Subramanyam, K. R. (2002), “Do non-audit service fees impair auditor 
independence? Evidence from going concern audit opinions”, Journal of Accounting Research, Vol. 40 No. 4, 
pp. 1247-1274. 
Firth, M., Oliver, M. and Wu, X. (2012), “How do various forms of auditor rotation affect audit quality? Evidence 
from China”, The International Journal of Accounting, Vol. 47 No. 1, pp. 109-138. 
Francis, J. (1984), “The effect of audit firm size on audit prices: A study of the Australian market”, Journal of 
Accounting and Economics, Vol. August. 
Francis, J. and Simon, D. (1987), “A test of audit pricing in the small-client segment of the US audit market”, 
Accounting Review, Vol. January. 
Garcia-Blandon, J. and Argiles, J. M. (2015), “Audit firm tenure and independence: a comprehensive investigation of 
audit qualifications in Spain”, Journal of International Accounting, Auditing and Taxation, Vol. 24, pp. 82-93. 
Geiger, M. A. and Raghunandan, K. (2002a), “Auditor tenure and audit reporting failure”, Auditing: A Journal of 
Practice & Theory, Vol. 21 No. 1, pp. 67-78. 
Geiger, M. A. and Raghunandan, K. (2002b), “Going-concern opinions in the "new" legal environment”, Accounting 
Horizons, Vol. 16 No. 1, pp. 17-26. 
Geiger, M. A. and Rama, D. V. (2003), “Audit fees, nonaudit fees, and auditor reporting on stressed companies”, 
Auditing: A Journal of Practice & Theory, Vol. 22 No. 2, pp. 53-69. 
Geiger, M. A., Raghunandan, K. and Rama, D. V. (1998), “Costs associated with going-concern modified audit 
opinions: An analysis of audit changes, subsequent opinions, and client failures”, Advances in Accounting, Vol. 
16, pp. 117-139. 
Gujarati, D. N. (2003), Basic econometrics (4th ed.), New York: McGraw-Hill Higher Education. 
Haniffa, R M, & Cooke, T E. (2002). Culture, corporate governance and disclosure in Malaysian corporations. 
ABACUS, 38(3), 317-349.  
Hosmer Jr, D. W., Lemeshow, S. and Sturdivant, R. X. (2013), Applied logistic regression (3rd ed.), New Jersey: 
Wiley. 
International Federation of Accountants (2010), ISA 570, Going Concern. Kuala Lumpur: Malaysian Institute of 
Accountants. 
International Federation of Accountants (2015), ISA 570, Going Concern (Revised), Kuala Lumpur: Malaysian 
Institute of Accountants. 
Ji, G. and Lee, J. E. (2015), “Managerial overconfidence and going-concern modified audit opinion”, The Journal of 
Applied Business Research, Vol. 31 No. 6, pp. 2123-2138. 
Johl, S, Jubb, C A, & Houghton, K A. (2007). Earnings management and the audit opinion: Evidence from Malaysia. 
Managerial Auditing Journal, 22(7), 688-715.  
Junaidi, J. H., Miharjo, S. and Hartadi, B. (2012), “Does auditor tenure reduce audit quality?”, Gadjah Mada 
International Journal of Business, Vol. 14 No. 3, pp. 303-315. 
Kane, G. D. and Velury, U. (2002), “The role of institutional ownership in the markets for auditing services: An 
empirical investigation, Journal of Business Research, pp. 1-8. 
Karaca-Mandic, P., Norton, E. C. and Dowd, B. (2012), “Interaction terms in nonlinear models”, HSR: Health 
Services Research, Vol. 47 No. 1, pp. 255-274. 
Kausar, A., Taffler, R. J. and Tan, C. E. L. (2015), “Legal regimes and investor response to the auditor's going concern 
opinion”, Journal of Accounting, Auditing & Finance, pp. 1-33. 
Kenny, D. A. (2015), Moderator variables: introduction, Retrieved from http://davidakenny.net/cm/moderation.htm 
Kida, T. (1980), “An investigation into auditors' continuity and and related qualification judgments”, Journal of 
Accounting Research, Vol. 18 No. 2, pp. 506-523. 
Knechel, R. W. and Vanstraelen, A. (2007), “The relationship between auditor tenure and audit quality implied by 
going concern opinions”, Auditing: A Journal of Practice & Theory, Vol. 26 No. 1, pp. 113-131. 
689 
 
The Impact of Management, Family, and Institution on The Auditor’s Going Concern Opinion Issuance Decision 
 
 
Koh, W. and Lee, K. (2017), “Do auditors recognize managerial risk-taking incentives?”, International Journal of 
Business, Vol. 22 No. 3, pp. 206-229. 
Kothari, S. P., Shu, S. and Wysocki, P. D. (2009), “Do managers withhold bad news?, Journal of Accounting 
Research, Vol. 47 No. 1, pp. 241-276. 
Krishnan, G. (2003), “Does Big 6 auditor industry expertise constrain earnings management?’, Accounting Horizons, 
Vol. 17 No. Supplement, pp. 1-16. 
Lafond, R, & Roychowdhury, S. (2008). Managerial ownership and accounting conservatism. Journal of Accounting 
Research, 46(1), 101-135.  
Lai, K. W. (2009), “Audit opinion and disclosure of audit fees”, Journal of Accounting, Auditing & Finance, Vol. 24 
No. 1, pp. 91-114. 
Li, C. (2009). Does client importance affect auditor independence at the office level? Empirical evidence from going-
concern opinion. Contemporary Accounting Research, 26(1), 201-230.  
Lim, C. Y. and Tan, H. T. (2008), “Non-audit service fees and audit quality: The impact of auditor specialization, 
Journal of Accounting Research, Vol. 46 No. 1, pp. 199-246. 
LogisticRegressionAnalysis.com (2013), What are Z-Values in Logistic Regression?, Retrieved December 15, 2015, 
from http://logisticregressionanalysis.com/1577-what-are-z-values-in-logistic-regression/ 
Loudder, M. L., Khurana, I. K., Sawyers, R. B., Cordery, C., Johnson, C., Lowe, J. et al. (1992), “The information 
content of audit qualification”, Auditing: A Journal of Practice & Theory, Vol. 11 No. 1, pp. 69-82. 
Masyitoh, O C, & Adhariani, D. (2010). The analysis of determinants of going concern audit report. Journal of 
Modern Accounting and Auditing, 6(4), 26-37.  
Mayhew, B W, & Wilkins, M S. (2003). Audit firm industry specialization as a differentiation strategy: Evidence 
from fees charged to firms going public. Auditing: A Journal of Practice & Theory, 22(2), 33-52.  
Md. Ali, A, Sahdan, M H, Harun Rasit, M H, & Teck, H L. (2008). Audit specialisation in Malaysia. International 
Journal of Business and Management, 3(3), 91-99.  
Minutti-Meza, M. (2013), “Does auditor industry specialization improve audit quality?”, Journal of Accounting 
Research, Vol. 51 No. 4, pp. 779-817. 
Mohd Iskandar, T, Rahmat, M M, Mohd Noor, N, Mohd Saleh, N, & Ali, M J. (2011). Corporate governance and 
going concern problems: evidence from Malaysia. International Journal of Corporate Governance, 2(2), 119-
139.  
Mutchler, J. F. (1985), “A multivariate analysis of the auditor's going-concern opinion decision”, Journal of 
Accounting Research, Vol. 23 No. 2, pp. 668-682. 
Mutchler, J. F. (1986), “Empirical evidence regarding the auditor's going-concern opinion decision, Auditing: A 
Journal of Practice & Theory, Vol. 6 No. 1, pp. 148-163. 
Mutchler, J. F., Hopwood, W. and McKeown, J. (1997), “The influence of contrary information and mitigating factors 
on audit opinion decisions on bankrupt companies”, Journal of Accounting Research, Vol. 35 No. 2, pp. 295-
310. 
O'Keefe, T. B., Kin, R. D. and Gaver, K. M. (1994), “Audit fees, industry specialization, and compliance with GAAS 
reporting standards”, Auditing: A Journal of Practice & Theory, Vol. 13, pp. 41-55. 
Osman, M. N. H., Turmin, S. Z., Muhamad, H. and Hussain, R. (2016), “Auditor characteristics and the issuance of 
going concern opinion”, International Business Management, Vol. 10 No. 17, pp. 3733-5250. 
Owhoso, V. E., Messier, W. F., and Lynch, J. G. (2002), “Error detection by industry-specialized teams during 
sequential audit review”, Journal of Accounting Research, Vol. 40, pp. 883-900. 
Peng, C. Y., Lee, K. L. and Ingersoll, G. M. (2002), “An introduction to logistic regression analysis and reporting”, 
The Journal of Educational Research, Vol. 96 No. 1, pp. 3-14. 
Raed, W. J., and Yezegel, A. (2018), “ Going-concern opinion decisions on bankrupt clients: Evidence of long-lasting 
auditor conservatism?”, Advances in Accounting, pp. 20-26. 
 
690 
 
International Journal of Economics and Management 
 
 
Read, W. J. (2015), “Auditor fees and going-concern reporting decisions on bankrupt companies: additional 
evidence”, Current Issues in Auditing, Vol. 9 No. 1, pp. A13-A27. 
Reynolds, J. and Francis, J. (2001), “Does size matter? The influence of large clients on office-level auditor reporting 
decisions”, Journal of Accounting and Economics, Vol. 30, pp. 375-400. 
Ryu, T. G., Uliss, B. and Roh, C. (2009), “The effect of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act on auditors' audit performance”, 
Journal of Finance and Accountancy, Vol. 1 No. August, pp. 1-7. 
Sarkar, S. K., Midi, H. and Rana, S. (2011), “Detection of outliers and influential observations in binary logistic 
regression: An empirical study”, Journal of Applied Sciences, Vol. 11 No. 1, pp. 26-35. 
Schroeder, M. S., Solomon, I. and Vickrey, D. (1986), “Audit quality: The perceptions of audit committee 
chairpersons and audit partners”, Auditing: A Journal of Practice & Theory, Vol. 5 No. 2, pp. 86-94. 
Shafie, R., Md. Yusof, M. A. and Md Hussain, M. H. (2004), Laissez-fair or mandatory auditor rotation: The case of 
audit firm tenure and audit firm switching, Paper presented at the Fourth Asia Pacific Interdisciplinary Research 
in Accounting Conference, Singapore. 
Shafie, R., Wan Hussin, W. N., Md. Yusof, M. A. and Md Hussain, M. H. (2009), “Audit firm tenure and auditor 
reporting quality: Evidence in Malaysia”, International Business Research, Vol. 2 No. 2, pp. 99-109. 
Sharma, D S, & Sidhu, J. (2001). Professionalism vs commercialism: The association between non-audit services 
(NAS) and audit independence. Journal of Business Finance & Accounting, 28(5), 595-629.  
Simunic, D. (1984). Auditing, consulting, and auditor independence. Journal of Accounting Research(Autumn), 679-
702.  
Simunic, D. (1980), “The pricing of audit services: Theory and evidence”, Journal of Accounting Research,Vol. 
Spring. 
Solomon, I., Shields, M. and Whittington, R. (1999), “What do industry-specialist auditor know?”, Journal of 
Accounting Research, Vol. 37, pp. 191-208. 
Tepalagul, N. and Lin, L. (2015), “Auditor independence and audit quality: a literature review”, Journal of 
Accounting, Auditing & Finance, Vol. 30 No. 1, pp. 101-121. 
Thai, S. B., Goh, H. H., Teh, B. H., Wong, J. C. and Ong, T. S. (2014), “A revisited of altman z-score model for 
companies listed in Bursa Malaysia”, International Journal of Business and Social Science, Vol. 5 No. 12, pp. 
197-120. 
The Star Online (2015), 1MDB’s RM13.4bil assets had been tested and at fair value, The Star Online  Retrieved 
November 18, 2015, from http://www.thestar.com.my/Business/Business-News/2015/06/10/Deloitte-stands-
by-No-going-concern-on-1MDB-for-financial-year-2014/?style=biz 
The World Economic Bank (2016), GDP growth (annual %) Retrieved October 26, 2016, 2016, from 
http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.KD.ZG?end=2012&locations=MY&start=2006 
Vanstraelen, A. (1999), “The auditor's going concern opinion decision: A pilot study”, International Journal of 
Auditing, Vol. 3, pp. 41-57. 
Vanstraelen, A. (2000). Impact of renewable long-term audit mandates on audit quality. The European Accounting 
Review, 9(3), 419-422.  
Wan Abdullah, W. Z., Ismail, S. and Jamaluddin, N. (2008), “The impact of board composition, ownership and CEO 
duality on audit quality: The Malaysian evidence”, Malaysian Accounting Review, Vol. 7 No. 2, pp. 17-28. 
Williams, D. D. (1988), “The potential determinants of auditor change”, Journal of Business Finance & Accounting, 
Vol. 15 No. 2, pp. 243-261. 
Young, A. and Wang, Y. (2010), “Multi-risk level examination of going concern modifications”, Managerial Auditing 
Journal, Vol. 25 No. 8, pp. 756-791. 
 
 
 
 
691 
 
The Impact of Management, Family, and Institution on The Auditor’s Going Concern Opinion Issuance Decision 
APPENDIX 
APPENDIX 1 Panel Logistic Regression (Random Effect Model) Dependent Variable = GCOP, N = 644 - NY 
Hypothesis and Variables Predicted signs  Coefficient (z-statistic) Prob. 
Intercept ?  -5.017 (-6.399) *** 
Independent variables     
H1 SPECLS +  1.011 (1.631)  
H2 TENURE +  0.256 (1.852) * 
H3 AUDFEE +/-  1.64E-06 (1.041)  
     
MANINF -  5.642 (2.160) ** 
FAMINF +  -2.636 (-1.361)  
INSTINF +   5.341 (1.464)  
Moderating effect     
H4 SPECLS*MANINF -  -5.049 (-2.104) ** 
H5 TENURE *MANINF -  -1.369 (-2.485) ** 
H6 AUDFEE*MANINF -  1.16E-06 (0.204)  
H7 SPECLS*FAMINF +  0.832 (0.575)  
H8 TENURE*FAMINF +  0.740 (1.886) * 
H9 AUDFEE*FAMINF +  -2.29E-06 (-0.502)  
H10 SPECLS*INSTINF +  -2.954 (-0.808)  
H11 TENURE*INSTINF  +  -0.569 (-0.809)  
H12 AUDFEE*INSTINF +  -1.25E-05 (-1.322)  
Control variables     
PROBFL Nil  -0.500 (-5.241) *** 
NON1STGC +  3.613 (8.158) *** 
DEFULT +  0.007 (2.179) ** 
AUDSIZE +  -0.200 (-0.470)  
CLTSIZE (TA) -  1.07E-07 (0.660)  
AUSTDD +  -0.122 (-0.372)  
CGSTDD +  0.991 (2.271) ** 
INDS +/-  0.046 (1.186)  
     
Likelihood Ratio Statistic (p)   290.106 (0.000)  
McFadden R-squared   0.454  
H & L [X2(8)] (p)   6.268 (0.617)  
     
Note: *** p< 0.01, ** p < 0.05 and *p < 0.10. SPECLS = Auditor specialization (1,0). TENURE = Auditor tenure. AUDFEE = Audit fee. 
MANINF = Management ownership. FAMINF = Family ownership. INSTINF = Institutional ownership. AUDFEEX = Client probability 
of failure (z-score). NON1STGC = Non first-timer GC opinion recipient (1,0). DEFULT = Debt default. AUDSIZE = Auditor size (1,0). 
CLTSIZE = Client size. AUSTDD = Auditing standard (1,0). CGSTDD = Corporate governance standard (1,0). INDS = Industries. 
 
APPENDIX 2 The Period of Economic Downturn vs. the Main Findings 
Hypothesis and Variables  Predicted signs  2009 and after  Main analysis (from Table 4.5) 
 Coefficient (z-statistic) Prob.  Coefficient (z-statistic) Prob. 
Intercept ?  -4.968 (-4.539) ***  -5.024 (-6.537) *** 
Independent variables        
H1 SPECLS +  1.325 (1.496)   1.065 (1.566)  
H2 TENURE +  0.321 (1.787) *  0.245 (1.675) * 
H3 AUDFEE +/-  1.54E-06 (0.756)   1.90E-06 (1.308)  
        
MANINF -  6.497 (2.000) **  5.561 (2.605) *** 
FAMINF +  -3.111 (-1.276)   -2.765 (-1.934) * 
INSTINF +   1.957 (0.329)   5.003 (1.189)  
Moderating effect        
H4 SPECLS*MANINF -  -6.199 (-1.715) *  -5.458 (-2.372) ** 
H5 TENURE *MANINF -  -1.681 (-2.458) **  -1.299 (-2.554) ** 
H6 AUDFEE*MANINF -  6.17E-06 (0.813)   1.04E-06 (0.212)  
H7 SPECLS*FAMINF +  -0.655 (-0.317)   0.934 (0.667)  
H8 TENURE*FAMINF +  1.051 (2.187) **  0.754 (2.171) ** 
H9 AUDFEE*FAMINF +  -3.97E-06 (-0.695)   -1.68E-06 (-0.443)  
H10 SPECLS*INSTINF +  -0.468 (-0.077)   -2.470 (-0.811)  
H11 TENURE*INSTINF  +  -0.557 (-0.469)   -0.570 (-0.590)  
H12 AUDFEE*INSTINF +  -5.84E-06 (-0.455)   -1.01E-05 (-1.145)  
Control variables        
H1 AUDEXF Nil  -0.599 (-4.106) ***  -0.491 (-4.213) *** 
NON1STGC +  3.503 (6.339) ***  3.591 (8.286) *** 
DEFULT +  0.014 (2.331) **  0.008 (2.051) ** 
AUDSIZE +  -0.691 (-1.175)   -0.185 (-0.435)  
CLTSIZE -  -0.000 (-0.799)   -0.000 (-0.806)  
AUSTDD +  0.037 (0.087)   -0.097 (-0.301)  
CGSTDD +  N/A   1.000 (2.349) ** 
INDS +/-  0.086 (1.661) *  0.045 (1.146)  
        
Likelihood Ratio Statistic   216.360 (0.000)   290.068 (0.000)  
McFadden R-squared   0.518   0.453588  
H& L [X2(8)] (p)   7.942 (0.439)   13.155 (0.107)  
Total observation    388 (GC opinion = 89, else = 299)  644 (GC opinion = 127, else = 517)  
Note: *** p< 0.01, ** p < 0.05 and *p < 0.10. SPECLS = Auditor specialization (1,0). TENURE = Auditor tenure. AUDFEE = Audit fee. 
MANINF = Management ownership. FAMINF = Family ownership. INSTINF = Institutional ownership. AUDFEEX = Client probability 
of failure (z-score). NON1STGC = Non first-timer GC opinion recipient (1,0). DEFULT = Debt default. AUDSIZE = Auditor size (1,0). 
CLTSIZE = Client size. AUSTDD = Auditing standard (1,0). CGSTDD = Corporate governance standard (1,0). INDS = Industries.  
